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What Trademark Law Is Learning from the Right of Publicity 
Barton Beebe* 
In 2006, Stacey Dogan and Mark Lemley published the now classic article “What 
the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law.”1  There they urged us to 
“[r]econceiv[e] the right of publicity as a trademark-like right,”2 particularly because 
“looking at the right of publicity through the lens of trademark law offers logical 
ways to limit the right.”3  Right of publicity law’s failure to incorporate trademark 
law’s limitations had resulted, they argue, in the right of publicity functioning as “a 
mutant version of trademark policy . . . .”4 
I argue here in response that regrettably, notwithstanding Dogan and Lemley’s 
good advice, the reality is that it is trademark law that has become more like right of 
publicity law.  Indeed, trademark law is in danger of becoming a “mutant version” 
of right of publicity policy.  To defend this claim, I will first briefly survey the 
conventionally-recognized similarities and differences between trademark law and 
right of publicity law.  I will then propose a more complicated—and, I think, more 
accurate—comparison between the two areas of law and argue that they are 
converging in many important ways, giving us the worst of both worlds.  In what 
follows, I will focus more on trademark law, not only because many other 
contributions to this Symposium thoroughly discuss right of publicity law, but also 
because I think we should be especially concerned with trademark law’s mutation in 
the age of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores5 and Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission6 into a kind of right of publicity law for corporate personhoods. 
Before I proceed, I should emphasize one point from the start.  I very much doubt 
that Dogan or Lemley would disagree with the general thrust of my argument, not 
least because much of it draws upon other work by them. 
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I. THE CONVENTIONALLY-RECOGNIZED SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRADEMARK LAW AND RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY LAW 
I first compare the policy goals understood to be guiding the two areas of law and 
then turn to a comparison of their subject matter, scope of rights, defenses, and 
limitations. 
In terms of the customary policy justifications for the two areas of law, there are 
apparent differences.  We conventionally say that trademark law protects trademarks 
from infringement and thereby maintains the integrity of the trademark system in 
order (1) to minimize consumer search costs and (2) to encourage firms to maintain 
consistent levels of product quality.7  This is the orthodox law and economics 
justification for trademark protection.8  It makes obvious good sense with respect to 
trademarks on products like pharmaceuticals or food.  If we acknowledge only this 
justification for the protection of trademarks, then we will be in a position to conclude 
that trademark law, with its emphasis on search costs, is very different from right of 
publicity law. 
But the orthodox law and economics justification makes less sense when applied 
to goods whose primary purpose is to convey social distinction, such as certain kinds 
of apparel.9  This social distinction may be conventionally hierarchical in nature, and 
this is how lawyers almost invariably think about social distinction—such that 
society consists essentially of one giant U.S. News & World Report ranking.10  But 
social distinction may more generally take the form simply of non-hierarchical, 
horizontal difference from mass society.11  In light of the role that trademarks play 
in facilitating the consumer’s sense of identity, we sometimes admit that we protect 
trademarks from infringement to preserve firms’ incentives to produce signs of social 
difference and to preserve the distinguishing function of those signs of social 
difference.12 
It is conventionally thought that different justifications motivate right of publicity 
law, and Jennifer Rothman reviews them quite effectively in her book The Right of 
Publicity:  Privacy Reimagined for a Public World.13  As she points out, the notion 
 
 7. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995); Thomas & Betts 
Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 65 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 8. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987) (setting out a law and economics analysis of trademark doctrine). 
 9. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 
(2004). 
 10. Admittedly, Jeremy Sheff’s work presents good reasons for reading much of the trademark case 
law in these terms.  See Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 771–72 (2012). 
 11. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 
827–28 (2010). 
 12. See, e.g., adidas Am., Inc. v. Skechers USA, Inc., 890 F.3d 747, 761 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming 
injunction of the defendant’s sale of certain athletic shoes to protect “the value adidas derives from the 
scarcity and exclusivity of the Stan Smith brand”). 
 13. JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:  PRIVACY REIMAGINED FOR A PUBLIC 
WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press 2018); see also DAVID TAN, THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF FAME:  
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that right of publicity law strives to protect consumers from deception is 
unpersuasive, not least because right of publicity law typically does not require a 
showing of likelihood of consumer confusion.14  Instead, a variety of other 
justifications have been adduced over the years for right of publicity protection:  It 
incentivizes the creation of celebrity personas;15 it prevents the overgrazing or 
tarnishment of those personas and protects the public’s interest in stable celebrity 
identities;16 it provides an appropriate reward for the labor that goes in to the 
development of a valuable personal identity;17 and it prevents misappropriation or 
unjust enrichment of that value.18  And finally, a rationale that emerges in part from 
the earliest origins of right of publicity law is that the law protects the individual 
liberty and dignitary interests of identity holders.  It enables identity holders to 
engage in what Mark McKenna calls “autonomous self-definition”19 and protects 
them from certain forms of emotional harm, a rationale which Rothman also 
endorses.20 
We care about rationales because they guide—or at least tend to have some 
influence on—the specific rules that make up trademark law and right of publicity 
law.  An example of their influence is found in the differing subject matters of 
trademark law and right of publicity law.  Individual identities, and especially 
individual celebrity identities, routinely qualify for trademark protection.21  
Corporations, by contrast, cannot qualify for right of publicity protection (at least not 
yet), apparently because corporations do not have privacy, dignitary, or autonomous 
self-definition interests, and do not suffer emotional harms.22 
 
A CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PASSING OFF 45–62 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2017) (reviewing theoretical justifications for right of publicity). 
 14. See ROTHMAN, supra note 13, at 102. 
 15. See id. at 99–102; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) 
(“[Right of publicity] protection provides an economic incentive for [the beneficiary of such protection] 
to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.”); Lugosi v. Universal 
Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 840 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (“[P]roviding legal protection for the 
economic value in one’s identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation creates a powerful 
incentive for expending time and resources to develop the skills or achievements prerequisite to public 
recognition . . . .”). 
 16. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 222–27 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003) (discussing congestion 
externalities caused by overuse of celebrity identities); Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property 
and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999) (considering audience reliance interests 
in preserving stable meanings of cultural objects). 
 17. See ROTHMAN, supra note 13, at 105–10. 
 18. See id.; TAN, supra note 13, at 54–55. 
 19. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 
225, 232 (2005). 
 20. See ROTHMAN, supra note 13, at 110–12. 
 21. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogated by Lexmark 
Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (“[U]nauthorized use of a celebrity’s 
identity is a type of false association claim, for it alleges the misuse of a trademark . . . .”); Abdul-Jabbar 
v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[F]alse endorsement claims are properly 
cognizable under section 43(a)” of the Lanham Act). 
 22. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:41 (2d ed. 2018). 
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The influence of underlying rationales is also apparent in the two areas’ different 
tests for infringement and defenses to liability.  Commentators conventionally 
emphasize, as I did above, that under right of publicity law the plaintiff need not 
show that the defendant’s conduct is likely to confuse consumers as to source or 
sponsorship.  Instead, a defendant may be liable by merely invoking the identity 
holder’s identity, even if consumers do not believe that the identity holder is 
endorsing a product.23  The result is that right of publicity law is generally thought 
to offer a broader scope of protection to identity holders than trademark law has 
offered to trademark owners.24 
As for defenses, the various defenses available in right of publicity law, which are 
also thoroughly reviewed in Rothman’s book,25 tend to be relatively plaintiff-
friendly.  By comparison, trademark law’s Rogers v. Grimaldi test26 (which strictly 
speaking functions as a limitation on the plaintiff’s rights rather than a defense) is 
more than just defendant-friendly.  In operation, it has seemed until recently to be 
defendant-dispositive.  As the Ninth Circuit observed in Gordon v. Drape, “on every 
prior occasion in which we have applied the [Rogers] test, we have found that it 
barred an infringement claim as a matter of law.”27  Though, as I will discuss shortly, 
in Gordon, the Ninth Circuit has finally hinted at some possible limits on the Rogers 
test. 
There are other dimensions along which we can compare right of publicity law 
and trademark law—for example, their terms of protection or their approaches to 
assignability—that I will skip over here.  Instead, I will conclude this very brief 
survey of the conventional similarities and differences between the two laws by 
suggesting overall that trademark law has greater built-in limits, especially in its 
likelihood of confusion requirement and the very powerful Rogers test.  As Dogan 
and Lemley explained in 2006, “the structure and content of trademark law provide 
a theoretical justification for a bounded right of publicity.”28 
  
 
 23. Id. § 5:11. 
 24. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating “the right of publicity 
is broader and, by extension, protects a greater swath of property interests”). 
 25. See ROTHMAN, supra note 13, at 145–53. 
 26. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that “[i]n the context of 
allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name,” infringement will not be found “unless the title has 
no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the 
title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.”).  The Rogers test has since expanded 
to include a defendant’s use of a mark within the body of the defendant’s work.  See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Although this test traditionally 
applies to uses of a trademark in the title of an artistic work, there is no principled reason why it ought not 
also apply to the use of a trademark in the body of the work.”). 
 27. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 261 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 28. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 1, at 1190. 
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II. THE MUTATION OF TRADEMARK LAW INTO CORPORATE 
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LAW 
Despite all of the conventionally-recognized differences between trademark law 
and right of publicity, and Professors Dogan and Lemley’s hopes in 2006, I want to 
propose that it is trademark law that has increasingly taken on the characteristics of 
right of publicity law rather than the other way around. 
Consider the requirement—if it may still be called a requirement—in trademark 
law that a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s mark creates a likelihood of 
consumer confusion.  As many commentators have suggested, the likelihood of 
confusion test has arguably mutated into a mere likelihood of association test, which 
finds liability if consumers merely associate the defendant’s mark with the plaintiff, 
even if consumers are not ultimately confused as to the true source of the defendant’s 
goods and even if consumers’ association has no impact on their purchasing 
behavior.29  In its recent opinion in Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. 
v. Sec. Univ., the Second Circuit emphatically embraced this view:  “The modern test 
of infringement is whether the defendant’s use [is] likely to cause confusion not just 
as to source, but also as to sponsorship, affiliation or connection.”30  As the Int’l Info. 
court observed, the shift toward a mere association standard began at least with the 
1962 amendment to Lanham Act § 32 that deleted from the section the limiting 
phrase “purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods or services.”31  Formerly, 
conduct was actionable only when it confused “purchasers” and only when it 
confused them as to the source of the goods they were purchasing.  With this 
language removed, explained the Int’l Info. court, “the Act’s protection against 
infringement is not limited to any particular type of consumer confusion, much less 
exclusively to confusion as to source.”32 
Subsequent developments have only quickened the shift toward a mere 
association standard for confusion.  As Professors Dogan and Lemley recognize in 
their article on the merchandising right in trademark law, the merchandising cases of 
the 1970s and ‘80s consolidated the principle that a defendant may be liable for 
merely invoking the plaintiff’s identity and suggesting to consumers that the plaintiff 
has endorsed or merely acceded to the defendant’s conduct.33  Making matters worse, 
 
 29. See, e.g., Stacey Dogan, Bullying and Opportunism in Trademark and Right-of-Publicity Law, 
96 B.U. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (2016) (“Doctrines such as post-sale confusion, initial interest confusion, the 
merchandising right, and certain versions of affiliation confusion seem designed, at least in part, to prevent 
parties from evoking others’ trademarks, without regard to confusion among customers about the source 
or provenance of products.” (internal citations omitted)).  See also Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, 
Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010) (observing that “sponsorship and affiliation 
confusion has taken on a life of its own, leading courts to declare as infringing a variety of practices that 
might be confusing in some sense, but that do not affect consumers’ decision-making process.”). 
 30. Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 
2016) (quoting 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:76 (4th ed.)). 
 31. Trademark Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 87–772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962). 
 32. Int’l Info., 823 F.3d at 161. 
 33. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right:  Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461 (2005). 
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the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 amended section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
to include extraordinarily capacious language covering the kind of conduct that 
violates the act.34  The case law under section 43(a) now seems to suggest that anyone 
who does anything referential shall be liable to any entity that believes that it is 
“likely to be damaged”35 by that reference.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal’s 
recent opinion in Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG further suggests that the 
language of section 43(a) refers to any entity in the world, regardless of whether it is 
actually using a trademark within the territorial borders of the United States.36  In 
sum, what is conventionally recognized as one of the fundamental distinctions 
between trademark law and right of publicity law—that the former requires a 
showing of consumer confusion while the latter does not—has arguably become a 
distinction without a difference. 
One objection to this characterization of the evolution of the likelihood of 
confusion test in trademark law may stem from the claim that only the strongest 
marks benefit from the shift toward a mere association test for confusion.  But even 
if this claim is true, and it likely is not, it simply shows how trademark law has further 
followed—or at least paralleled—the example of right of publicity law.  Both areas 
of law increasingly express the legal logic of the economics of superstars, in which 
superstars—be they the strongest marks or the most famous celebrities—dominate 
their markets and further enable themselves to do so by promoting legal rules 
designed to protect and enhance their superstar status.37  In both areas of law, the 
stronger benefit from broader protection.38   
But probably the best expression of the mutation of trademark law into a right of 
publicity law for persons both natural and corporate is antidilution protection.39  
Here, the majority of courts interpret the anti-blurring provisions of the Lanham Act 
to require that the plaintiff show only that consumers associate the defendant’s mark 
with the plaintiff’s in order to trigger a finding of blurring.40  The leading survey 
method for dilution by blurring simply asks respondents what comes to their minds 
when they are exposed to the defendant’s mark; if respondents identify the plaintiff, 
 
 34. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–667, 102 Stat. 3935.  
 35. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
 36. Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 819 F.3d 697, 705–09 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 37. On superstar economics, see generally Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 845 (1981). 
 38. See Barton Beebe & C. Scott Hemphill, The Scope of Strong Marks:  Should Trademark Law 
Protect the Strong More than the Weak?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2017) (criticizing trademark doctrine 
that stronger marks enjoy a greater scope of protection).  
 39. See Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1061 (2006) (“If one goal of dilution is 
to prevent free riding, then dilution law starts to look somewhat like a right of publicity law for 
corporations . . . .”); see also Mary LaFrance & Gail H. Cline, Identical Cousins?:  On the Road with 
Dilution and the Right of Publicity, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 641 (2008) (comparing 
right of publicity protection and antidilution protection in various nations). 
 40. See Barton Beebe, Roy Germano, Christopher Jon Sprigman & Joel Steckel, Testing for 
Trademark Dilution in Court and the Lab, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 6) (on 
file with author) (discussing the “mere association” standard for trademark blurring). 
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then this is taken as evidence of blurring.41  The parallels with right of publicity 
protection are even clearer in anti-tarnishment protection, where corporations appear 
to possess something akin to dignitary interests.  This has been apparent in cases 
where the defendant has had the temerity to associate the New York Stock Exchange 
with gambling42 or to associate the Victoria’s Secret corporation with “sex-related 
products.”43  In these and other anti-tarnishment cases, courts rule according to 
rationales very similar to those in right of publicity law.44 
Still, I do not want to overstate my case.  Doing so would risk what I think is a 
common problem in academic intellectual property law writing, including in my 
own.  This is what might be called the problem of the self-fulfilling description, in 
which a scholar exaggerates how bad the law is on a particular issue (in order to sell 
the importance of the scholar’s topic).  In doing so, the scholar risks persuasively 
restating the law in such a way that judges and lawyers come to believe that the law 
is in fact as bad as the scholar says it is, and they decide cases and counsel clients 
accordingly.  I mean to refer to the practice of citing horrible edge cases as 
representative of the center of the law—which thereby helps to bring these peripheral 
cases into the center. 
Trademark law is certainly still its own thing, especially in the area of limitations 
and defenses.  The best example of this is the Rogers test.  But even here, we are 
beginning to see a breakdown.  The Ninth Circuit’s Gordon v. Drape probably still 
counts as an edge case, but it should give us cause for concern.  The author of the 
Gordon opinion was Judge Jay Bybee, who just happened also to author the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in the trademark case Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc., which applied 
the Rogers test to find no infringement.45  Judge Bybee likewise authored the 
majority opinion in the right of publicity case In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation, which held that Rogers cannot be applied to a right of 
publicity claim.46  In Gordon, Judge Bybee needed to find some limit on the Rogers 
test.  (And who can blame him? The test is probably too defendant-friendly.)  He 
found that limit in something like a transformativeness test, which analyzes “the 
degree to which the junior user uses the mark in the same way as the senior user” and 
the “extent to which the junior user has added his or her own expressive content to 
the work beyond the mark itself.”47  No doubt the copyright fair use concept of 
 
 41. See Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 1468, 2007 WL 2782030, at *2–4 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 18, 2007).  
 42. See N.Y. Stock Exchange, Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 555–58 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 43. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 384–89 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
562 U.S. 1179 (2011). 
 44. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that alterations 
to a trademark, “accomplished for the sole purpose of promoting a competing product, are properly found 
to be within New York's concept of dilution because they risk the possibility that consumers will come to 
attribute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate the mark with inferior goods and 
services.”). 
 45. 724 F.3d 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 46. 724 F.3d 1268, 1281–82 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 47. Gordon v. Drape Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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transformativeness was the ultimate origin of Judge Bybee’s transformativeness 
test.48  But one imagines the more immediate source was right of publicity law and 
specifically Judge Bybee’s emphasis on transformativeness in In re NCAA Student-
Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation.49  The risk is that Gordon has now 
opened the door to the inevitable reactionary swing away from the Rogers test and 
back toward speech-restrictive tests like those found in the 1979 case of Dallas 
Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.—or, more recently, in the Sixth 
Circuit’s 2010 majority opinion in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley.50 
There would be much more to say along these lines if I were adequately to 
persuade you of my point, but I want to take what time I have left instead to speculate 
on why we are seeing trademark law mutate into something like right of publicity 
law. 
III. EXPLAINING THE MUTATION 
I think there are several different explanations for the mutation of trademark law 
into a right of publicity law for corporate personas, many of which may be obvious 
to you.  I will briefly focus on two primarily to set out what might be an agenda for 
further research. 
The first relates to the legal concept of misappropriation and to the concept, now 
increasingly fashionable in the humanities, of “affect,”51 a term perhaps best defined 
broadly as intensities of feeling.  I very much doubt that courts are consciously 
patterning trademark law after right of publicity, and I suspect you doubt this too.  
Instead, courts applying trademark law and courts applying right of publicity law 
have both long been converging toward the general prevention of conduct they 
perceive to constitute misappropriation.52 
What is it that is being misappropriated?  Right of publicity law teaches us that it 
is something more essential than source or goodwill, or even what I mentioned 
above—commodified social difference.  The thing of value that is being 
misappropriated is raw positive affect in commodified form, which is especially 
 
 48. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–81 (1994) (discussing the 
copyright fair use concept of transformativeness). 
 49. See 724 F.3d at 1273–79. 
 50. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 384–85 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
562 U.S. 1179 (2011); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205–
06 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 51. See generally Gregory J. Seigworth & Melissa Gregg, An Inventory of Shimmers, in THE 
AFFECT THEORY READER 1 (Melissa Gregg & Gregory J. Seigworth eds., 2010) (discussing various 
definitions of affect and histories of the concept); Sunil Erevelles, The Role of Affect in Marketing, 42 J. 
BUS. RES. 199 (1998) (surveying academic studies of the role of affect in marketing). 
 52. See Dogan, supra note 29, at 1294 (“Normatively, both [trademark law and right of publicity 
law] have gravitated toward an unjust enrichment model, which gives trademark holders and celebrities 
support for a broad sense of entitlement to the economic value of their marks and identities.”).  See also 
id. at 1300 (“[C]ourts shaping [several modern trademark law] doctrines routinely deride parties for riding 
on the coattails of someone else’s success.  These courts seem to presume that one goal of trademark law 
is not to avoid harm, but to reserve to the trademark holder the fruits of its reputational investments.”). 
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valuable in a world filled with affectless mass-produced commodities but whose 
media is otherwise “characterized by a surfeit of [affect].”53  Just as a celebrity 
persona can endow a product with positive feeling, so too can a corporate persona as 
embodied in its trademark.  One need think only of Apple or of Nike.  More 
generally, so often when trademark law uses the term “aesthetic,” as in the Ninth 
Circuit cases struggling with the trademark law concept of “aesthetic 
functionality,”54 what we mean to refer to is affect and affective value.55  The anti-
misappropriation impulse in trademark law, as in right of publicity law, seeks to 
protect this affective value from free riders. 
The second explanation for the shift in trademark law toward a right of publicity 
framework for corporate personas is perhaps more interesting but also more difficult 
to prove.  Trademark law is both reflecting and contributing to the continued rise of 
corporate rights and attention to corporate personhood.56  If the merchandising cases 
of the ‘70s and ‘80s were one chapter in the recent evolution of trademark law,57 
another chapter—the one we find ourselves in the midst of right now—is the 
corporate personhood chapter.  Courts today are solicitous of corporations’ 
entitlement to “autonomous self-definition,”58 to borrow Mark McKenna’s term, and 
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perhaps even corporations’ right of privacy.59  Instead of corporate persona, we say 
“brand,” and this may explain why a good deal of scholarship would prefer to 
describe trademark law as “brand law” rather than trademark law.60 
IV. TRADEMARK LAW AS COMPETITION POLICY 
I will briefly conclude by asking how we might try to counteract trademark law’s 
shift toward a right of publicity sensibility.  This issue brings us to one important 
remaining difference between right of publicity law and trademark law.  Trademark 
law seeks, in essence, to promote competition.  By contrast, right of publicity law 
does not try to promote competition in the production of celebrity personas; much of 
right of publicity doctrine has been developed without any attention to optimizing 
competition for the benefit of consumers.61  This distinction may go far toward 
explaining why right of publicity rights are generally so much more expansive than 
trademark rights.  But just as competition concerns represent an important check on 
the expansion of corporate rights, so in trademark law, an emphasis on competition 
may help to limit the expansion of trademark rights stemming from—or at least 
coincident with—the rise of corporate rights.  As the federal courts shift ideologically 
more to the right and toward finding greater protections for corporate interests, it 
may be that economic arguments will find a more receptive audience than arguments 
driven by the First Amendment or a disaffection for consumer culture. 
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 61. On the possibility of using competition policy to limit the scope of the right of publicity, see 
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L. REV. 753 (2011). 
